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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, 
vs. 
SHAYNE M. HANSEN, 
Defendant/Respondent. 
Sup. Ct. No. 20010100-SC 
Ct. App. No. 990987-CA 
Priority No. 14 
REPLY BRIEF OF PETITIONER 
* * * 
Pursuant to rule 24(c), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the State submits this brief 
in reply to new issues raised in the respondent's brief or in this Court's decision in State v. 
Eisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073. 
ARGUMENT 
A. This Court Has Now Rejected the "Presumption Against Waiver" Test Applied 
by the Court of Appeals Below. 
The court of appeals below employed the following three-part test, heretofore referred 
to as the " Villano" or "presumption against waiver" test, for determining whether defendant's 
consent to search his vehicle was given voluntarily: 
"(1) There must be clear and positive testimony that the consent was 
'unequivocal and specific' and 'freely and intelligently given'; (2) the 
government must prove consent was given without duress or coercion, express 
or implied; and (3) [when evaluating these first two standards, we] indulge 
every reasonable presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional 
rights and there must be convincing evidence that such rights were waived." 
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State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, f 18, 17 P.3d 1135 (quotingState v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 
439 (Utah App. 1996). On certiorari, the State has argued that the "presumption against 
waiver" test should be renounced in favor of the "totality of the circumstances" test 
enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 
93 S.Ct. 2041 (1973), and consistently followed by this Court. See Pet. Brf. at 7-19. 
This Court has since adopted the position espoused by the State here, Pet. Brf. at 15-
19, in State v. Eisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073. The Court in Eisner observed that 
Schneckloth "flatly rejected the requirement that the prosecution establish waiver in order to 
demonstrate voluntariness," Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at \ 45, which is the very cornerstone of 
the Villano test. The Court thus concluded that "to the degree [the Villano test] hinges 
consent upon waiver—and to the extent our prior cases have not made our position perfectly 
clear—we today explicitly reject the court of appeals' voluntariness test. . . ." Id. at f 47. 
After rejecting the Villano test, the Eisner court reaffirmed the test enunciated in 
Schneckloth'. "When assessing whether consent to a warrantless search was given voluntarily, 
courts in Utah must follow the same analysis we have repeatedly applied since Schneckloth: 
Consent is not voluntary if it is obtained as 'the product of duress or coercion, express or 
implied.'" Id. {quoting Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2041). 
B. The Court of Appeals9 Application of the "Presumption Against Waiver" 
Standard Did Not Constitute Dictum. 
Defendant concedes that Eisner rejects the court of appeals' voluntariness test. See 
Resp. Brf. at 9. Notwithstanding that concession, defendant maintains that the court of 
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appeals "did not rely on those portions of [the test] that have been rejected." Resp. Brf. at 
9. According to defendant, the now-defimct "presumption against waiver" standard simply 
required a showing that the defendant was informed of the right to refuse consent to search 
and that he or she waived that right. See Resp. Brf. at 9-13. He argues that because the court 
of appeals did not address the need for an intelligent waiver, reference to that standard 
constitutes dictum. See Resp. Brf. at 13, 41. This contention lacks merit. 
As explained in the State's opening brief, see Pet. Brf. at 9, 15-17, the "presumption 
against waiver" standard employed by the court of appeals not only required a showing that 
defendant's consent was "intelligently" given, but also required the court to operate under 
the presumption that defendant did not voluntarily consent to a search. As again explained 
in the State's opening brief, Pet. Brf. at 15-17, Schneckloth rejected both requirements. See 
Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 234,243,93 S.Ct. at 2051,2056 (holding that "knowledge of a right 
to refuse is not a prerequisite of a voluntary consent" and that "it cannot be said [that] every 
reasonable presumption ought to be indulged against voluntary relinquishment"). 
Defendant argues that because the case did not turn on the issue of informed consent, 
reference in the case to the "presumption against waiver" standard is "inconsequential," 
"irrelevant," and "dictum." Resp. Brf. at 10-13. However, the court of appeals expressly 
employed the primary component of the "presumption against waiver" test—indulging in the 
presumption against waiver of the right to be free from an otherwise unlawful search. See 
Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, at f 18. In reviewing the circumstances of the consent, it did so 
under the assumption that defendant did not voluntarily consent to the search. Under the 
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court's view, that presumption could not be rebutted unless the State produced "clear and 
positive" testimony that voluntary consent to search was given. See id. at fflf 20-21, 25-26 
(insisting that testimony concerning consent be "clear and positive"). After reviewing the 
record, the court of appeals concluded: "Therefore, because we indulge every reasonable 
presumption against the waiver of fundamental constitutional rights, we hold that the trial 
court erred in concluding that Hansen's consent was freely and voluntarily given." Id. at f 
25 (emphasis added). 
Because the "presumption against waiver" standard was expressly relied on by the 
court of appeals in reaching its decision, it cannot be construed as mere dictum. 
C. The Requirement That the State Produce Clear and Positive Testimony of 
Consent Employs the "Presumption Against Waiver" Standard. 
Defendant also argues that the requirement that the State produce "clear and positive" 
testimony of consent "is another way of saying the State must prove consent with 
'substantial, competent evidence' on the matter." Resp. Brf. at 15 (quoting Bisner, 2001 UT 
99, at \ 42. That contention is nothing but an attempt to save the inappropriate requirement. 
Defendant cites to no case, and the State has found none, which has equated that 
language with the requirement that there must be "substantial, competent evidence" 
supporting consent. Indeed, the very language requiring "clear and positive testimony" 
implies a greater evidentiary burden than the preponderance of the evidence standard, which 
defendant concedes is the appropriate evidentiary standard. See Resp. Brf. at 15-16. On its 
face, the requirement appears to impose an evidentiary burden analogous to the "clear and 
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convincing evidence" standard which carries a higher evidentiary standard of proof than the 
preponderance standard. See Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, f^ 33, 20 P.3d 332. That is 
improper. 
Moreover, as discussed in the State's opening brief, the court of appeals' very 
application of the "clear and positive testimony" requirement resulted in the imposition of 
an inappropriate evidentiary burden. See Pet. Brf. at 24-27. Defendant attempts to justify 
the conclusion of the court of appeals, contending that Officer Huntington's testimony was 
merely conclusory. Resp. Brf. at 22-28. Yet, Officer Huntington testified that he asked 
defendant for consent to check his car for alcohol, drugs, or weapons and that defendant 
consented. R. 84: 17-18, 38-40. He frankly admitted that he did not recall the precise 
language used, but never wavered in his testimony that defendant consented to the search. 
See R. 84: 40-43. That trial court's finding of consent was thus "supported by substantial, 
competent evidence." See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42 (quoting State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 
684, 687 (Utah 1990)). 
As support for the State's position that the officer's testimony was sufficient to 
support the trial court's finding of consent, it cited to the decision of the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court in Commonwealth v. Boswell, 721 A.2d 336 (Penn. 1998). See Pet. Brf. at 
27. As in the case here, the officer testified that the defendant answered "yes" when he asked 
her if she would mind if he took a look inside her bag. Boswell, 721 A.2d at 338. Defendant 
attempts to distinguish Boswell, contending that the officer later clarified on cross-
examination that "'she said, "Go ahead.'" Resp. Brf. at 27 (quoting Boswell, 721 A.2d at 
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339) Defendant argues the facts here are unlike those in Boswell because when given the 
opportunity to clarify, Officer Huntington could only give "conclusory testimony, stat[ing] 
that he did not 'recall exactly other than it was consent,' and admitted he assumed he had 
consent." Resp. Brf. at 27-28 (quoting R 84.38-40). 
Defendant mischaractenzes the officer's testimony in Boswell, altogether omitting the 
fact that just like Officer Huntington, the officer in Boswell also "stated that he could not 
recall her exact words, but that she answered in the affirmative." Boswell, 721 A.2d at 339 
The Pennsylvania court described the testimony as follows: 
Trooper Knightly testified that the following exchange then took place 
between Officer Howard and Boswell: 
A: Officer Howard pointed down at the bag and said: "Is this your 
bag?" She stated, "Yes, it is." Officer Howard then asked: "Would 
you mind if I take a look inside this bag?" At that time, she said: 
"Yes." The Court: Wait a minute, hold it. He said: "Would you 
mind if I took a look inside this bag," and she said: "Yes," meaning 
that she would mind, nght? A: No, that he could do it. 
On cross- examination, Trooper Knightly clarified that when asked 
if she would mind if they looked in her bag, she said, 'Go ahead.' 
He stated that he could not recall her exact words, but that she 
answered in the m the affirmative 
Id. at 338-39 
The form of Officer Huntington's testimony was nearly identical to that of Officer 
Howard's in Boswell. See Pet. Brf. at 21-28 As in Boswell, only the officer testified at the 
suppression heanng. See id. at 343. As in Boswell, the officer's "uncontradicted testimony 
was that he did not recall [defendant's] exact words," but that defendant's response to the 
question of whether he would mind if he searched "was in the affirmative " Id And as in 
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Boswell, defendant "did not present any evidence to support [his] claim that [he] did not 
consent." Id. As such, Officer Huntington's testimony constituted "substantial, competent 
evidence" of consent. See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42. In sum, the court of appeals erred 
in concluding that the trial court's finding of consent was clearly erroneous. It reached that 
conclusion because it erroneously applied a presumption against waiver.1 
D. The "Substantial, Competent Evidence" Standard for Clear Error Is the Same 
as the "Clear Weight of the Evidence" Standard. 
Some confusion may also arise by Eisner's holding that it will find a trial court's 
factual findings clearly erroneous if they "are not 'supported by substantial, competent 
evidence.'" Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at \ 42 (quoting Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687). Utah appellate 
courts have not often referred to this "substantial evidence" standard in criminal ; ^ ses. It 
most frequently appears in civil cases addressing the findings of a trial court or 
administrative agency. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687 (citing 50 West Broadway Associates 
v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162, 1171 (Utah 1989)). 
defendant's argument relies in large part on the false premise that whether or not 
he consented to a search is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness. See Resp. Brf. at 
17-18. While "[voluntariness is primarily a factual question," State v. Thurman, 846 
P.2d 1256, 1262 (Utah 1993), this Court has reviewed consent findings as mixed 
questions of fact and law. As discussed in the State's opening brief, the ultimate issue of 
whether a consent is voluntary is a legal conclusion reviewed for correctness; on the other 
hand, whether consent was in fact given and the scope of that consent are underlying 
factual determinations reviewed for clear error. See Pet. Brf. at 20-21. Eisner does not 
hold otherwise. See Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at \ 42 (holding that "[t]he question of whether 
a party has voluntarily consented to a search is a question of law, and we therefore review 
it for correctness"). 
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Whereas Bisner and Arroyo referred to the "clearly erroneous" standard in terms of 
"substantial, competent evidence," this Court has generally characterized the standard 
somewhat differently. Generally, the Court has held that clear error will only be found 
"when viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court s ruling, the evidence 
is insufficient to support the trial court's findings." State v. Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 
1 P.3d 1108 (emphasis in original). "In other words, an appellant must show that the trial 
court's findings so lack support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, thus making 
them clearly erroneous." Id. (internal quotes omitted). Unless the appellate court is "left 
with a 'definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed,'" clear error will not 
be found. State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987). This "clear weight of the 
evidence" standard is arguably the best articulation of clear error. 
The substantial evidence standard, however, suggests nothing different. Because 
appellate decisions from criminal convictions are virtually silent on the meaning of 
"substantial, competent evidence," decisions from civil and administrative cases are 
instructive. This Court has held that the "substantial evidence" standard "'does not require 
or specify a quantity of evidence but requires only such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Harken Southwest Corp. v. Board 
of Oil Gas and Mining, 920 P.2d 1176, 1180 (Utah 1996) (quoting U.S. West Comms., Inc. 
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 882 P.2d 141, 146 (Utah 1994)) (other internal quotes omitted) 
(discussing substantial evidence standard required under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g)); 
accord First Nat'I Bank of Boston v. County Bd. of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163,1165 (Utah 
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1990). Simply stated, "[a] trial court's findings cannot be made up out of whole cloth." 50 
West Broadway Associates, 784 P.2d at 1171 (this case cited in Arroyo). 
Under the substantial evidence standard, the Court "will not substitute its judgment 
as between two reasonably conflicting views, even though [it] may have come to a different 
conclusion." Tasters Ltd. v. Dep 't of Employment Security, 819 P.2d 361, 365 (Utah App. 
1991). In other words, "if the evidence is such where reasonable men could arrive at 
different conclusions, [the Court is] prohibited from interfering." In re Swan's Estate, 51 
Utah 410, 170 P. 452, 456 (Utah 1918); accord State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 107 
(Utah 1980). Accordingly, like the "clear weight of the evidence" formulation, a party 
challenging a finding as not supported by substantial and competent evidence "'must first 
marshal all the evidence supporting the finding and then demonstrate that the evidence is 
legally insufficient to support the findings even in viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the court below.'" Consolidation Coal Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 
886 P.2d 514, 519 (Utah 1994); see Gamblin, 2000 UT 44, f 17 n.2, 1 P.3d 1108 
As argued above and in the State's opening brief, the trial court's finding that 
defendant consented to the search was not clearly erroneous, whichever articulation of the 
clearly erroneous standard is used. As such, the court of appeals erred in reversing that 
finding. 
* * * 
In summary, the court of appeals erred in employing the "presumption against waiver" 
test. Because only the second prong of that test survives Schneckloth, this Court should 
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reject it in its entirety in favor of the test enunciated in Schneckloth and its progeny. That test 
is best articulated as follows: 
After making the threshold factual finding that a defendant consented to a search, the 
trial court must determine whether the consent "was in fact 'voluntary' or was the product 
of duress or coercion, express or implied." Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct. at 2047-
48; accord Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 47. In determining whether a consent was given 
voluntarily, the court must look to "'the totality of all the surrounding circumstances,' 
including] ;1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the officers; 2) the absence 
of an exhibition of force by the officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the 
owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence of deception or trick on the part of the officer.'" 
Bisner,200\ UT 99, at f 47 (quoting State v. Whittenback, 621 P.2d 103, 106 (Utah 1980)); 
see also Schneckloth, 412 U.S. at 412 U.S. at 227, 93 S.Ct at 2047-48. "Even when a 
constitutionally valid consent is given, the scope of the ensuing search must be limited to the 
scope of the consent " State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1218 (Utah 1993). 
A trial court's determination regarding consent to search is a mixed question of fact 
and law. "The question of whether a party has voluntarily consented to a search is a question 
of law.. . review[ed] [ ] for correctness." Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42. However, the factual 
findings underlying the court's conclusion, including whether or not consent was in fact 
given and the scope of that consent, are reviewed for clear error. See Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 
687; see also Eisner, 2001 UT 99, at f 42. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above and in the State's opening brief, the State respectfully 
requests the Court to reverse the judgment of the court of appeals. 
Respectfully submitted this JO day of March, 2002. 
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